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for  allowing  them  to use  his  information  on Yugoslavia.I.  INTRODUCTION
In the  1980s developing  countries were  negatively  affected  by  the
international economy.  OECD economies' adjustment policies of the early 1980A
led  to a sharp  increase in  international  interest  rates  and to  a fall in  commodity
prices  which triggered  the  International Debt  Crisis.  While  in the  1970s
developing countries had ready access to international finance at negative real
interest rates, in  the 1980s international finance  became almost unavailable and
interest rates on foreign debt became positive in real terms. Such conditions
compelled  many h,ghly-indebted  developing  countries  to  repay  their  external debts
by producing  a net transfer abroad. The increase in  international interest  rates
to positive  levels also  increased these  countries' cost  of  servicing their
external debts.  To confront these new conditions highly-indebted developing
countries resorted to very different debt strategies.
Existing  literature has devoted considerable attention to the Latin
American experience but less  has been given  to heavily-indebted EMENA countries.
This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. It analyzes the experiences of six
EMENA  countries  in  coping  with  the  effects  of  changes in  the international  economy
during the 1980s.  The objective of the paper is to draw the differences and
parallels bet een the experiences of these EMENA countries and those of the
highly-indebted Latin American countries.  This will enable us to distinguish
the positive and negative aspects of each experience.  The six EMENA countries
are: Algeria, Morocco,  Pakistan, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia.  The main
criterion for  their selection  was diversity in strategies followed to deal with
the  International  Debt  Crisis.  The  only  common  feature  is  that  all  are
heavily-indebted countries.-2-
This paper is  also  different from  other studies in  the  methodology used.
Unlike other studies that have used flow data, we use data on stocks of i..otal
public  debt  to  estimate  rea. total public debt  and real  public  sector  (or
operational) deficits. 2 This methodology will enable us to make comparisons
among countries.  But more importantly, by using stock data we will be able to
define  a  consistency  framework that  links the  public, external  and private
aectoru; and  to consolidate  the non-financial  public  sector and  the central  bank.
The consistency framework will enable us to analyze the effects of the public
debt strategy on macroeconomic performance.  The consolidation will provide us
a more accurate measure of the total public  sector debt, the  public sector
(non-financial  public sector  and  quasi-fiscal)  deficit and  the  sources of finance
used.  For instance, it is common for central banks in developing countries to
take the  role  of the  public  sector  and  extend low-cost  loans  to  particular sectors
of the economy thus  generating the so-called "quasi-fiscal  deficits."  Also, the
consolidation of the non-f  inar,￿ial and central bank will allow us to use and
estimate of  the  total  net  public sector  external  debt, i.e.,  including  the foreign
assets and liabilities of the central bank.  However, a disadvantage of using
stocks of debt is  that the anaJysis  of the  public sector  will be limited  to total
public sector debt, the size of public sector deficits and their sources of
finance.  It  will not  ￿ossible  to analyze  the composition of the revenues and
expenditures.  But su￿  extensions are beyond the scope of this paper.
We  concluded that strategies differ among  countries and that these
different  strategies  distinguish  the  successful  from  the  unsuccessful  experiences.
2/  This methodology initially was developed in S. van Wijnbergen, R. Anand, A.
Chibber and  R. Rocha (1992).  It  was also used for  the report:  World Bank (1990).
For further extensions and applications see  Rocha (1991),  van Wijnbergen (1989)
and Thorne (1991).Co-ntries that coped successfully  with the negative external shock of the early
1980e were  those that:  (i) minimized  the effects of the external  shocks by
combining an external and domestic debt strategy; (ii) adjusted their fiscal
deficit;  (iii)  experienced a positive external snock; and (iv)  fostered growth
by stimulating export growth and develooing their domestic financial marke.s.
In contrast, the less successful countries were the ones that postponed their
fiscal  adjustment and increased  their total public sector indebtedness.  In  such
cases the persistent fiscal imbalances led to a combination of high inflation
rates and borrowers' reluctance to lend.  In the extreme cases--notably some
Latin  American countries--this led  to a dramatic surge in inflation levels  which
imposed a fiscal adjustment.  The fiscal adjustment is a key element, not so
much as an instrument to reduce the size of total real debt, but as a way to
liwit the growth in the total real debt to GDP ratio and as a way to impose
greater efficiency to the economy.  But fiscal adjustment, fostering growth and
the reform of the  financial system, should be sequenced in a pre-determined
manner.  For instance, a quick opening of the financial system in the absence
of a fiscal adjustment could result in an increase in the inflation level, high
real interest rates and a slowdown in GDP growth, thus undermining the overall
strategy.
The organization of the paper is as follows.  The next section opens
the disc ssion on the public sector debt strategy by analyzing the size of the
public debt and its composition among external and domestic sectors and the
central bank.  This discussion on countries' debt strategies is further pursue
by explaining the role of exogenous and endogenous factors in increasing the
ratios of external and domestic debt to GDP.  The third section analyzes the
role of fiscal deficit and financing and their effects on inflation.  It also- 4 -
looks at the problem of sustainable fiscal policy.  The forth section examines
the effect of the public sector indebtedness on the domestic financial system.
This  will be  done by  analyzing  the transfer  problem and  its  effects  on the  private
sector.  In the last section we summarize our most important conclusions.
II.  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEBT  STRATEGY
A  key  objective  of  this  comparative  study  is  to  understand  the  differences
among countries in their public debt strategies.  This can be done by analyzing
how each country met the debt solvency condition and to what extent they also
met the debt creditworthiness condition after the external shock of the early-
19809.  The importance of the early-l980s external shock is that it led many
countries to fail in  meeting the debt creditworthiness condition. 3 The analysis
of how countries met these two conditions would enable us to understand to what
extent the public debt strategy and fiscal policy, in general, was sustainable.
The solvency  condition says  that the net  present value of  total net  public sector
debt cannot be greater than the net present value of its total net fixed assets
or, what is the same, that the net present value of the public sector net worth
cannot be negative.  The creditworthiness debt condition is a  more difficult one
and refers to the lenders' perception of the public sector ability to service
its debt.  This says that it is not only necessary for the public sector to be
able to promptly service itL debt, but that their lenders will also need to be
convinced that this in fact will happen.  Usually creditworthiness is assessed
by the total public sector debt to GDP ratio and. in the case of external debt,
also by its ratio to total exports.
3/  See Cohen (1985).In this section we will use the debt  solvency and creditworthiness
conditiorns  to guide cur analysis of the evolution and composition of public
sector indebtedness.  Although it is rare for a country to fail in meeting the
debt solvenc7y  condition because it is always possible to increase taxes (con-
ventional  or  the  noncc  nventional inflation-tax)  or  reduce  expenditures, a  greater
level  of indebtedness is  associated with worsening of  economic conditions, i e.,
lower economic growth.  It is apparent that the rate of growth is affected by
the tax level, by  the size of public sector  expenditures and by sharp reductions
in  public sector investment.  Therefore, increases in  the level of public sector
indebtedness not corresponded by increases in public sector fixed assets would
result in a lowering of public sector net worth.  The analysis of public sector
indebtedness will be undertaken by examining the evolution in total nat Public
ebt.  This is a better proxy  for public sector net worth than the external
public sector debt used in other studies.  The creditworthiness debt condition
will  be analyzed (in  this  and the following  section)  by  examining how  the external
shock of the early-1980a affected the size of total public debt--i.e., the debt
solvency condition--and the domestic policies that eacih  country undertook to
reduce the size and costs of servicing total public debt.  In other words, the
domestic policies  undertaken by each country to regain creditworthiness.
A.  Evolution  of  Public  Debt
In the period 1979-89, the evolution of total public sector (PS) debt
for the six countries showed two very different patterns.  (See Figures la and
lb and Table  1.)  The first pattern consisted of the total level of public
indebtedness peaking in the mid-1980s and then falling in the late-1980s. The
countries  where  this  was  more  apparent  are  Morocco,  Portugal,  Turkey  and-6-
Yugoslavia.  But of these  four countries, Moro'co  is the  country where  the
decreasing trend was less apparent; and Portugal and Yugoslavia where  it was
more apparent.  The second pattern consisted of a constantly increasing trend
in the  level of  public  indebtedness. Examples are the cases of Algeria and
Pakistan.  However, this pattern was slightly more pronounced in Algeria than
it was in Pakistan.
Concerning the level of total public debt, Morocco is the country with
the highest level.  By the mid-1980s, Morocco's ratio of total public debt to
GDP reached about 130 percent.  Although the _-ther  countries' level of total
debt was lower, it was very high by international sta.ndards. For instance,  the
ratio of total public debt to GDP reached a maximum of about 92 percent in 1989
for  Algeria; 109  percent in  1984  for  Portugal  and 95  percent in  1989 for  Pakistan.
These ratios compare closely to the total public debt to GDP ratios for Italy
and Belgium, which are  the OECD  countries with the highest  level of public
indebtedness.  (In 1986, Italy's ratio was 99 percent and Belgium's was  128
percent. 4)  The other two cruntries, Turkey and Yugoslavia, had a lower ratio
of  total public debt  to GDP thus indicating  a lower level  of  public indebtedness.
In Turkey this ratio reached a maximum of 63 percent in 1988 and in Yugoslavia
it reached 52 percent in 1984.
External Public Sector Debt.  Another important characteristic of the
evolution of  total public  debt has  been the large  contribution  of external public
debt.  In  most of the six countries the external public debt accounted for more
than half of the total public debt.  This characteristic has been particularly
clear during the periods of the highest level of public indebtedness, such as
4/  See: OECD (1990).s~~~~~~~u
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TABLE  1: STRUCTURE  UF PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEBT
(Percentage  of GDP)
ALGERJIAz
1980-81  1982-84  1985-89
1. TOTAL DOMES,IC  DEBT PLUS
CENTRAL BANK FINANCE
A. Domoac  Debt Finance  14.4  18.6  21.3
Bnks  3.0  3.3  5.2
Privat  Sector  5.1  6.4  5.8
BAD & CNEP  6.3  8.9  10.4
B. Central Bank Finance  15.9  13.7  19.3
11.  T.TAL  NET FOREIGN DEBT  39.5  49.0  58.3
(Excl. K Losses/Gains)
Liabi'__es  50.8  56.1  63.7
A.st  11.2  7.1  5.4
Ila. TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  31.6  26.3  30.1
(Incl. K Loses/Gains)
MEMO:
ACCUMU! ATED FOREIGN  -8.0  -22.7  -28.1
EXCHANGE LOSSES (lla-ll)
Domeat  Debt Incl. Bad  82.0  85.6  68.5
Loans  to Enterprises
1980-81  i982-84  1985-89
I. TOTAL  DOMESTIC  DEBT  PLUS
CENTRAL  BANK  FINANCE
A. Domestic  Debt Finance  18.0  22.2  31.0
Net Bank  Credit  8.0  9.4  15.2
Specialized  Fin. Org.  1.9  2.2  2.0
NonFinancial  Private  Sector  3.2  3.0  7.3
Arran  4.9  7.6  6.5
B. Central Bank  Finance  9.5  8.  i  5.7
11.  TOTAL  NET FOREIGN  DEBT  51.1  59.7  58.7
(End. K Loue/Gains)
Liablitie  53.0  60.4  59.8
A"ots  1.9  0.7  1.l
Ila. TOTAL  YJET  FOREIGN  DEBT  55.5  88.7  91.8
(ncl. K Loss/Gains)
MEMO:
ACCUMULATED  FOREIGN  4.4  29.0  33.:
EXCHANGE  LOSSES  (Ila-II)
TOTAL  NET FOREIGN  DEBT  51.1  55.3  54.0
(Exc.  K Losa/Gains
and  Debt Relief)-10  -
TABLE 1: STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT (cont...)
(Percentage of GDP)
PA  A  .... "
1980 '  1982-84  1985-89
1.  TOTAL  DOMESTIC  DEBT  PLUS
CENTRAL BANK FINANCE
A. Domectic Debt Finance  20.8  22.2  38.3
B. Central B  Finamce  12.8  13.0  10.1
It. TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  34.6  38.4  31.5
(Excl. K Losses/Gains)
Llabilitiea  42.7  47.9  36.2
Auts  8.1  9.5  4.8
I[.  TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  29.9  31.9  38.8
(Inc. K Losses/Gains)
.4EMO:
ACCUMULATED FOREIGN  -4.6  -6.5  7.4
EXCHANGE LOSSES (Ie-11)
1980-81  1982-84  1985-89
I. TOTAL NET DOMESTIC DEBT PLUS
CENTRAL BANK FINANCE
A. Total Domestic Debt  41.6  40.0  47.3
1. Iaztruments
Bonds and Bills  18.3  15.0  34.3
Tresuiry  bills  0.0  0.0  10.7
Governent  bonds and other  18.3  15.0  23.7
Not Bank Credit  23.3  25.1  13.0
2.  Borrowers
General Government  20.1  18.4  35.6
Nonfinancial PSEs  21.4  21.7  11.7
B. Centra  Bank Finance  19.7  19.6  15.7
I.  TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  14.8  27.9  15.6
(Exd.  K Lossem/Gains)
Foreip Liabilities  40.9  47.5  45.9
Foreign Asse  26.2  19.6  30.3
Ia.  TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  14.8  41.9  21.3
(lad. K Lo.au/Galin)
MEMO: ACUMULLATED  FOREIGN  0.0  14.0  5.7
EX(H.  LOSSES (Ill-ll)- 11  -
TABLE 1: STRUCTURE  OF PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEBT  (contt...)
(Percentage  of GDP)
luRt;mY:  ^....  ... 
1980-81  1982-84  1985-89
1. TOTAL NET DOMESTIC DEBT PLUS
CEN  rRAL BANK  FINANCE  (A+B)
A. Total  Do-esic  Debt  6.0  3.3  6.3
Bonds  and Bills  3.5  3.4  5.6
Net  Bank Credit  3.1  1.9  1.8
EBFs  -0.5  -2.0  -1.1
Borrowers
Central GO ernment  2.4  2.9  5.3
Nonfunacial SEEs  4.1  2.4  2.1
EBFs  -0.5  -2.0  -1.1
B. Central Bank Finance  4.3  6.7  6.6
II. TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  19.5  21.0  26.7
(Excl. K Loswa/Gains)
Ila. TOTAL NET FOREIGN DEBT  ^.!.2  29.0  43.0
(Incl. K Loscs/Gains)
MEMO: ACUMULATED FOREIGN  1.7  8.0  16.4
EXCH. LOSSES (_ a-Il)
y..G  .0.  S,,,>  As,,,  V-.....
1980-81  1982-84  1985-87
Total Net Foreign Debt  33.3  47.0  37.4
(Lacl. K losaes/Gamns)
Total Net Foreign Debt  34.3  43.6  29.3
(cxcl. K loswa/Gains)
SOURCE: See statistical annexes.
II Percentage of GNP
2/ Percentage of GSP- 12  -
the mid- and late-1980s,  and the most extreme examples are Morocco, Turkey and
Yugoslavia.  In  the case  of Morocco total external debt accounted for 80 percent
of total public debt at its highest in 1985, 79 percent for Turkey in 1988 and
100 percent for Yugoslavia in 1984.  Although in the other countries external
debt was not as important, nonetheless it made for about 50 percent of total
public debt.  In Algeria external debt accounted for 48 percent of total debt
in 1989, 45 percent for Pakistan in 1989 and 47 percent for Portugal in 1984.
The high proportion of external public debt makes these six countries'
external debt burden comparable to those of the highly-indebted countries. On
average, the external debt to  GDP ratio for  the period 1983-85, (when  it reached
its  highest  level)  was  100  percent  for  Morocco,  49  for  Yugoslavia,  45  for  Portugal,
33 for Turkey, 32 for Pakistan and 23 for Algeria.  For the same period this
ratio  was 47  percent for  the  highly-indebted countries. However, these six EMENA
countries are different from the highly-indebted in two respects.  First, not
all  of  the six countries  were classified as  highly-indebted and  thus not  eligible
of the special treatment that these countries  were subjected to.  This in a way
explains the differences in debt strategy followed.  And second, unlike the
highly-indebted countries, the six EMENA countries hold a substantial amount of
domestic debt. 5
Do-estic  Public Sector Debt.  The composition  between external and
domestic public debt is another important feature of the six EMENA countries.
Perhaps with the exception of Yugoslavia, the rest of the countries showed an
increasing trend in  their domestic debt to GDP ratios.  This starts in the early
S/  Brazil and  Mexico  are exceptions  of highly-indebted  countries  with low levels
of domestic public debt.- 13 -
1980s, whict'  coincides  with the beginning of the external debt problem.  'Jithin
th- six  countries there hav,  been two distinct  patterns.  The first one  consisted
of those countries whose domestic debt to GDP ratio increased sharply.  These
are  the  cases  of Paki3tan  and  Morocco.  Pakistan's  ratio increased from  21  percent
in 1980-81 to 38 percent  in 1985-69, while Morocco's increased from 18 to 31
percent.  The second pattern consisted  of the countries  whose ratio did not show
a sharp increase, but whose ratio evidence the importance of domestic debt in
total public debt.  These were the cases of Algeria whose ratio increased from
14  percent in  1980-81  to  21  percent in  1985-89;  and  Portugal  whose ratio  increased
from  41  to 47 percent.  Although Turkey's  domestic debt has  been relatively small
as a share of total public debt, it showed a faster increase in the second half
of  the 1980s.  The ratio of domestic debt to GDP increased from 3 percent in
1982-84 to 6 percent in 1985-89.
Central  Bank Public Sector Debt.  Another issue  concerns the importance
of central bank debt and its relation to total and domestic public debt.6 Once
again, it is possible to distinguish two distinct patterns among the six EMENA
countries.  The first is the group of countries where central bank debt was
important relative to total public debt.  The countries where this have been
more apparent are  Algeria and Turkey.  It has also been the case of Yugoslavia,
but data is not reported.  In the cases of Algeria and Turkey this type of debt
was as important as the total domestic debt.  In Algeria and for the period
1980-86 the ratio central bank debt to GDP was 20  percent of GDP, while domestic
debt was 22 percent; and in Turkey, it was 8 percent while domestic debt was 9
6/  The ratio  of total central  bank debt  to  GDP measures  the ral" stock of  central
bank public sector debt outstanding and should not be taken as the volume of
central bank finance.- 14 -
percent.  The second pattern  are the countries where  this type of debt was
relatively unimportant.  These have been the -ases of Morocco  and Pakistan.
Portugal has been a rare case because although central bank debt was important,
it was relatively low compared to total and domestic public debt.
The increasing reliance on  domestic and central bank debt starting in
the early-1980s has been an  important feature of countries' response to the
external debt problem.  Countries responded to the increasing cost of external
debt and to the international market rationing, by increasing their domestic or
central bank debt.  Analyses of some individual country experience indicates
that this was explained by the authorties' inability to increase in the short
run the volume of public revenues. 7 Tax systems in  most of these countries were
either inefficient (low  level of compliance)  or their tax bases were very narrow
(due  to low income levels).  In the past--partly due to the access to low-cost
international debt--the individual country authorities felt no need to develop
their  tax systems and thus when the external debt crisis occurred most countries
had weak tax systems.  The increase in  tax revenues required a comprehensive tax
reform, and in most cases this constituted a long-term reform. Also, and for
similar reasons, the mix between domestic and central bank debt is related to
the ability of the authorities to increase their borrowing domestically.  As
will be discussed later, this was due to the fact  that some countries had a  more
developed  domestic financial  system  which  was  capable  of  providing  this additional
financing and that the authorities followed a low-inflation policy to encourage
its development further.
7/  Examples are: Montiel and Haque (1990)  and Faini (1991).- 15  -
An important perspective of the public debt problem of these six EMENA
countries can be provided by comparing their experience with that of the more
developed OECD  countries. 8 First  is the  composition of debt.  While these
countries'  total  public  debt  consisted  mainly  of  external  debt,  developed
countriesI public sector  debt consisted  mostly of  domestic debt.  This  difference
made the debt problem of these six countries more prone to external shocks as
that of the  early-1980s.  Second is the use of debt.  While more developed
countries increased their level of indebtedness to finance their capital accu-
mulation (the only exceptions being the finance of wars), this is not so clear
in the case of these six countries.  If that was the case, the productivity of
capital  would have increased in  the 1980s.  And there is  no indication that that
happened.  On the contrary, there is indication that the external public debt
substituted partly for current revenues as evidenced by the weakening of their
tax  systems and also that  it was invested in not very efficient  investment
projects.  These differences made the public debt problem of these countries
more difficult and countries more prone to external and domestic shocks.  Third
is the method used for reducing the debt to GDP ratios.  In the case of the
developed  countries  this  resulted  from  an  increase  in  capital  productivity (higher
growth rates) and an increase in tax revenues.  The six EMENA countries showed
a different pattern.  x  first group while reducing their total public debt,
increased their domestic public debt; and  the second  group increased their total
public debt by increasing central bank public debt.
8/  See Buiter (1985); Chouraqui, Jones and Montador (1986) and OECD (1990).- 16 -
B.  Factors  Explaining  the Change  in the  Debt  to GDP  Ratio
We now  can turn to the analysis of the  effects of the early-1980s
external shock and of domestic policies on the total public sector debt to GDP
ratio. This  will enable us  to further  understand  the  differences in  debt  strategy
followed by etch country.  In particular, it will enable us to understand how
differently each of these six countries was affected by the external shock and
how they responded.  In addition, it will enable us to understand the factors
that led  the debt to GDP ratio  to i  icrease  (or  decrease) faster in some  countries
relative to others.  The exogenous factors  will be defined as the effects of the
external shock on the debt to  GDP ratio and  the endogenous factors  as the effects
of domestic policies.
External Debt
We can analyze the effects of the external shock and of the domestic
policies on the external PS debt by breaking down the change in the external PS
debt to GDP ratio as shown in equation (1):
(1)  [ b*t  t  1  A[b6*t '  e 8 0 ]  [Ab  *.t  e,  - A  b  *  .t] Al  _  --  +
rgdpjt  rgdpt  rgdpt
[Ab*t  e,  it-  Abd*tn.8o]  [b*t-l  et  1
rgdpt  - rgdJ  - rgdpt
b*  is the  stock of  total  net  PS debt  in current  US  dollars  divided by  a
trade-weighted  average  international price  index with weights  given by  the- 17 -
currency composition of each country's trade, e is the real effective exchange
rate, rgdp is the GDP in constant 1980 prices, S*  is the stock of net external
PS debt in dollars net of capital losses due to fluctuations in international
exchange rates  (measured at 1980 exchange rates) divided by an international
trade-weighted average  price index  net  of fluctuations  in international  exchange
rates (also  measured at 1980 exchange rates), e is the real effective exchange
rate using this international price index net of fluctuations in international
exchange rates,  A  indicates  first  difference of  a  variable,  a hat  above  a  variable
indicates the rate of change and the subscripts on variables are indices for
time period.
Using equation (1)  we can analyze  both the  effects of the  external shock
and of domestic policies.  The first term in equation (1) measures the effect
of changes in  the stock  of external PS debt free of capital losses, that is,  the
debt measured at 1980 international and domestic exchange rates.  This estimate
is unaltered by both changes in the international exchange rates or changes in
domestic real exchange rate or  both.  Although the conventionally  measured ratio
of external PS debt to GDP  (Figures la and lb) can artificially fall if the
authorities let  the  domestic currency  overvalue or if  the international  exchanges
rates fluctuate, the first term in  equation (1)  would be unaffected. The second
term, the effect of foreign factors or exogenous factors, measures the effect
of changes in international  exchange  rates and in  the composition  of  the external
PS debt.  (Although it also includes cross effects, these are assumed to be
small.)  The third term measures the effects of changes in the real effective
exchange rate.  And the forth term measures the effect of the rate of growth of
GDP.  These estimates are reported for the six countries in Figures 2a and 2b.- 18 -
Exogenous Factors.  Using equation  (1) we can explain the different
elements of each country external debt strategy.  We start by considering the
effects of the external shock.  The six countries differ in terms of access to
fresh  external resources.  In  general,  t,;e  greater a  country's access  to external
resources, the less painful the adjustment to the 1980s external shock.  This
is indicated by the change in the stock of external PS debt free of capital
losses.  When it is positive, it indicates that the cou  benefitted from a
positive transfer from abroad and when  it is negative ix indicates that the
country experienced a negative transfer.  A  key difference between these six
countries and the Latin American highly-indebted countries was their access to
foreign financing in 1930-84.  In 1980-84, the six countries increased their
stock of external PS debt free of capital losses (raised real resources from
abroad).  In 1985-89, the experience of these six countries differed.  While
Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan and Morocco ben?fitted from a transfer from abroad,
Portugal and Yugoslavia had to transfer resources  abroad. 9 The access to foreign
resources made  the  adjustment to the  external conditions of the  1980s less
painful.
The other  foreign  factor was  the combined effect  of the  change  in
international prices and in composition of external PS debt.  The price and
currency  composition  effects  quantifies  the effect  of  trade shocks  on  the  external
PS debt.  This results from our definition of stock of external PS debt in 1980
constant dollars, as expressed by equation (2):
9/  Portugal's case is different from that of Yugoslavia.  While Yugoslavia
performed a transfer abroad by repaying external PS debt, Portugal accumulated
a large volume of foreign exchange reserves as a result of its good economic
performance.  However, in both cases the effect was to reduce the net external
PS debt.- 19  -
FIGURE  2a
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(2)  B*
b *  -=
P*
B* is the stock  of external PS debt denominated in  current dollars and P* is the
trade-weighted average  international price index with weights given by trade
currency composition.
Equation (2)  indicates that it will be more expensive for a country to
service its debt if the currency composition of the debt and trade differ and
if the trade-weighted average international price index falls.  These effects
will undermine the cost of the external PS debt by making it  more expensive in
terms  of  purchasing  power  parity  of  trade  flows. This  will be  true  notwithstanding
the fact that a price fall might result in an unrealized capital loss because
it  will have an immediate effect on: (i)  the  amortization and interest payments;
and (ii) the country's creditworthiness. The effects of this price index (P*,
Int.  Cur. Prices) for  each of the six countries is illustrated in Figures 3a and
3b  by comparing its  evolution to  that of  the  trade-weighted average international
price index free of fluctuations in international exchange rates (P*,  Int.  Adj.
Prices).10
In 1980-89, it is possible to distinguish four  patterns in  terms of the
effect of trade shocks on external k: debt for these six countries.  First is
the case of Yugoslavia, which was positively affected, that is, experienced an
increase in its trade-weighted international price index and thus a terms of
10/  The real exchange rates  (RERI) reported in these figures were estimated
using  the  IMF  methodology. An increase  in  the index  indicates  a  real  c-vervaluation
and a  fall a real devaluation.- 22 -
trade gain.  Second  are the cases of Pakistan and Portugal which,  although
experiencing a decline in its  trade-weighted international  price index (a loss)
in 1980-84, recovered most of this loss in 1985-89.  Third are the cases of
Morocco and Turkey which, even though experiencing a more sizeable loss shock
in 1980-84, recovered  most of it  and  made an additional  gain in 1985-89  relative
to the 1980 level.  The forth is the case of Algeria, whioh experienced an even
more sizeable loss in 1980-84 and only recovered part of it in 1985-89, thus
sustaining a loss relative to the 1980 level. 11
However and as a way to off-set these price effects, most countries
decided to change their trade currency composition or their external PS debt
currency composition or both. This explains why these six countries' external
PS  debt  to  GDP ratio  was reduced  by  the  combined  effect  of changes  in  international
prices and in currency composition (third  term in equation (1), see Figures 2a
and 2b).  On average in 1980-84 the fall in the external PS debt to GDP ratio
explained by these effects was 5.3 percent of GDP in  Morocco, 2.3 in  Turkey, 2.3
in  Algeria, 2.1 in  Yugoslavia, 1.8 in Pakistan, and 0.3 in  Portugal.  The change
in  currency  composition also  explains  that in  1985-89  the effect  was the  opposite:
to increase the external PS debt to GDP ratio.  (Note that in the majority of
countries most of the effect was concentrated in 1985-87, thus suggesting a
degree of surprise.)  Nevertheless, in 1985-89 the magnitude of the effect of
the change in international prices and currency composition was small and most
countries  were more prepared to absorb it than they were in 1980-84.  In 1985-89
11/  Algeria's decline in the trade-weighted average international price index
was explained, to a large  extent, by  the switch in its  trade currency  composition
in the early-1980s.- 23 -
the increases in the external PS debt to GDP ratio explained by these effects
were: 3.6 percent of GDP in Morocco, 3.6 in Yugoslavia, 2.6 in Turkey, 2.2 in
Portugal, 1.8 in Algeria and 1.1 in Pakistan.
Endogenous Factors.  Concerning the domestic response to the external
shock,  countries  responded  by  devaluing  their  real  exchange  rate  and  by  stimulating
a faster  rate of growth  of  GDP. 12 In  general and assuming  that  exports are  elastic
to the real effective exchange rate, a more depreciated exchange rate would
reduce  the external  PS debt  to  export ratio;  and  a higher  GDP growth,  as indicated
by equation (1),  would reduce the ratio of external PS debt to GDP.  However for
a country to effectively regain creditworthiness, the negative effect of the
depreciation in  the real exchange rate on the external PS debt to GDP ratio has
to be smaller than its positive effect on the rate of growth of real exports.
In other words, the depreciation of the real exchange rate effectively needs to
produce a switch of resources away from the production of non-tradeables and
into the production of tradeables in a very short period of time, otherwise it
might increase the external PS debt to GDP and undermine the  'ate  of growth of
GDP.
Evidence for the six countries shows that only a  few countries suc-
cessfully managed to devalue  their real exchange rate and to induce  a higher GDP
growth (see  RERIs in  Figures 3a  and  3b). The successful  ones  were Turkey,  Morocco
and  Portugal.  Algeria  and  Pakistan  decided  for  the  less  risky  option  of stimulating
growth in the short term by allowing the overvaluation of their real exchange
rates.  Yugoslavia is an example where a real devaluation failed to result in
12/  Such a policy was usually part of a more comprehensive adjustment effort
and included a  exchange rate policy and aggregate demand management.- 24 -
a higher export and GDP growth.  Although in the case of Yugoslavia this it had
to do with its nature of being a socialist economy in transition to a market
one; this experience is also very common among Latin American countries. 13
It  is  important to  note  that  the  three  successful  countries  (and
Yugoslavia) also accomplished a reduction in  the external P" debt to GDP ratio.
However,  this  reduction  happened  notwithstanding  the  fact  that,  with  the  exception
of Portugal, they were also borrowing from the international market.  The three
countries owed their success to their rapid policy response and positive supply
response.  The  three  countries undertook  their  domestic  adjustment  in  the
early-1980s in  response  to  the  external shock. Although there  were  very important
differences in the design of the adjustment programs, in all three the effects
on the external PS debt to GDP ratio were similar.  In 1980-84, all of them
experienced a heavy capital loss in their external PS debt as a result of the
real devaluation, which was only partly offset by the effect of the rate of
growth of GDP.  This loss however resulted in a  benefit in 1985-89.  All of them
experienced a very rapid growth in real GDP and in real exports.  Also, some
countries allowed their real exchange rates to overvalue.14
The magnicude of these effects illustrates  the trade-offs made by these
countries.  In 1980-84, Mcrocco's external PS debt to GDP ratio increased by
14.5  percent of GDP as a result of the devaluation of the real exchange rate and
13/  Obviously the reasons have been different.  While in Yugoslavia the lack
of supply response had to do with its socialist nature, in the case of the Latin
American countries it had to do with the ill-designed adjustment policies.  For
an  interesting account  of  economic  adjustment in  socialist  countries  see Fabrizio
Coricelli and Roberto Rocha (1991).
14/  In some countries the overvaluation  was not the result  of a strong economic
performance (the fundamentals), such as was the case of Portugal after joining
the EEC, but rather it was a policy decision, such as was the case of Turkey.- 25  -
FIGURE 3a
FOREIGN ADJUSTED AND CURRENT PRICES AND RERI
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FIGURE  3b
FOREIGN  ADJUSTED  AND  CURRENT  PRICES  AND  RERI
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it only fell by 2.2 percent of GDP as a result of the higher rate of growth of
GDP.  The net effe.t accounted for most of the 12.4 percent of GDP increase in
the total external PS debt to GDP ratio.  The experiences of Turkey and Portugal
are similar.  The devaluation of the real exchange rate increased the external
PS debt to GDP ratio in Turkey by 5.7 and in Portugal  by 4.7 percent of GDP; and
the rate of growth reduced this ratio by 1 and 0.3 percent of GDP, respectively.
Therefore, in  total the external PS  debt to  GDP in these two countries increased
by 4.2 and 5.2  percent of GDP, respectively.  However, in 1985-89 the experience
changed.  Morocco's and Portugal's external PS debt to GDP ratio fell by 3.9
and 9.9, respectively, of which 4.3 and 2.5 percent of GDP was accounted for by
the higher GDP growth and 3.8 and 4.4 percent of GDP was accounted for by the
effect of the real exchange  rate.  In the  same period Turkey  increased its
external PS debt to GDP ratio by 0.4 percent of GDP, but both the rate of growth
of GDP and the real devaluation had the effect of reducing the ratio in 1.4 and
2 percent of GDP, respectively.
Compare  these  experiences to  those of Algeria  and  Pakistan.  Both
countries postponed their devaluation and in 1980-84 benefitted from a capital
gain and from the effect of the positive growth in GDP.  This enabled them to
reduce  the external PS debt  to GDP ratio in  the  mid-1980s.  However, this changed
in 1985-89.  Pakistan started to devalue its real exchange rate  in 1983 and
Algeria in 1985, which resulted in a sharp increase in the external PS debt to
GDP ratio.  Although both countries  managed to continue growing, this effect  was
not strong  enough to outweigh the  effect of the real  devaluation.  The net effect
was  an increase in their external PS debt to GDP  ratio.  Another  important- 28 -
difference  with the  three successtul  countries  was  that they  did not  accomplished
their transformation into  export-oriented  economies as  was the case of the three
successful countries.
Domentin Debt
We can analyze  the factors  affecting  the domestic  PS debt  by decomposing
its  ratio to  GDP, as  we did with  the external PS debt.  This is shown in  equation
(3):
(3)  [  Bt  1  p  rgdp
Lrgdp  t  Ptrr gdpt  PL  trgdpt_ t
B is the stock of total domestic PS debt in current prices, P is the end-period
domestic price index with base in mid-1980, b is the stock of domestic PS debt
in 1980 constant prices (b=B/P), rgdp is the GDP in 1980 constant prices, the
subscripts are indices for time period, and a hat above  a variable indicates
the rate of change.
Equation  (3) breaks down the domestic PS debt to GDP ratio into four
components (see estimates in Figures 4a and 4b).  Using these four components
we can understand the differences in countries' domestic debt strategies.  The
first component measures  the volume  of  nominal debt  issued, the  other  two
components measure the extent to which countries used the rate of inflation and- 29 -
a higher rate of growth as mechanisms to reduce their domestic PS debt to GDP
ratio. The last component, which is almost negligible, is the cross effect of
the rate of inflation and rate of growth of GDP.
Evidence for the five countries (Yugoslavia  is excluded because it had
no domestic PS debt) suggests: (i) a common response to the external shock rf
the  early-1980s; and (ii)  three  different  domestic  debt  strategies. All  countries
responded to this shock by slowly increasing their domestic PS debt to GDP in
1982-84 and  accelerating  it  in 1985-89.  The  three  distinct  domestic  debt
strategies combined a fast  growth in  their  nominal domestic  debt (first  component
in equation  (3)) with either a high rate of growth of GDP or a high rate of
inflation as forms  of reducing their  domestic debt  to GDP ratios.  The trade-offs
in choosing one or the other alternative can be explained by using the debt
solvency condition as expressed in equation (4):
P  ~(r  -rgdpt)<0  wvhere:  rt=pl  X 
r is the real interest rate on domestic PS debt and rgap  is the rate of growth
of real GDP,  i is the nominal interest rate on domestic PS debt, pj  is the
expected inflation rate and the subscript indicate indices for time period.
Equation  (4)  says that the debt to GDP ratio can be increased as long
as the difference between the real interest rate and the rate of growth of GDP
is leS  than zero.  This solvency condition states that the income generatedR  - _  s  0  1  ,  $  2~
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FIGURE  4b
DECOMPOSITION  OF  CHANGES  IN DOMESIC  DEBI  TO  GDP  RATIO
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would be sufficient to repay the debt. 15 However, if this difference turns
negative, for instance, because of a lose in creditors' cor.fidence,  then the
solvency condition can only be satisfied by amortizing the debt  (this is the
so-called transversality condition). 16 Therefore, the ideal debt strategy is
the  one  that  would allow  a  country to  increase  the  debt  without inducing  creditors
to lose  their confidence. This  can  best  be accomplished  by  increasing  the nominal
debt  while undertaking a low-inflation  and  high-growth  policy.  The low-inflation
would encourage asset-holder's demand for Government securities (by increasing
their return and reducing the level of risk  involved), while a high rate of
growth of  GDP  would reduce  the domestic  debt to  GDP ratio. A strategy to  increase
the debt to GDP ratio while generating high inflation as a method of reducing
the debt to GDP ratio is ri.ky.  In  general, a high inflation  rate by increasing
the variance of the ex-ante real interest rate would result either in a fall in
the demand for  Government securities  or in  an increase in  the real interest rate.
Therefore, a strategy to reduce the domestic debt to GDP ratio by increasing  the
rate of inflation would limit the ability to raise domestic debt.
Let's now consider the three domestic debt strategies followed by these
five  countries.  First  is  the strategy  followed  by  Morocco, Pakistan  and  Portugal,
which  were the countries that increased  the  domestic PS debt  to GDP ratio faster.
These countries  combined low-inflation  and  high-growth policies to  encourage the
demand for Government securities while keeping their domestic PS debt to GDP
ratio relatively low.  Of the three Pakistan is  the country that exploited this
strategy most.  However, there are a few factors that made Pakistan's strategy
1S/  In net present value terms, it states that the net present value of the
debt is  smaller  than the  net  present value  of  total income  or of  total net  wealth.
16/  See Cohen (1985)  and Buiter (1985)  for a discussion of these debt solvency
conditions.- 33 -
less admirable than that of Morocco and Portugal.  First was the absence of an
explicit policy for  reducing the size of the total debt.  Domestic debt was used
in  addition to  rather than  as a  substitute for  external  debt.  Second  and  related,
was the absence of an economic adjustment.  Both of these effects resulted in
a constant increase in total domestic PS debt to GDP ratio.  The problems of
this strategy were apparent in the late-1980s.  While the authorities continued
increasing the nominal domestic debt (first  component in  equation (3)),  the rate
of growth of GDP provided limited  relief and the inflation rate started becoming
a more important method of reducing the domestic PS debt to GDP ratio.  However
and in spite of these difficulties, the rate of gro,,th  remained high and that
of inflation low.
The experiences of Morocco and Portugal were more revealing.  Both
countries had a policy to reduce their total PS debt to GDP ratio.  The domestic
debt increased because they reduced their external debt faster than the their
total debt.  In other words, they used the domestic debt as a substitute for
external debt.  In addition, both countries (as  explained before) started their
economic adjustment in the mid-1980s.  These positive elements of their debt
strategy became apparent in the change in the components of the domestic debt
to GDP ratio.  While in 1982-84 they increased their nominal debt and used the
inflation rate as the main instrument to reduce the domestic debt to GDP ratio,
in 1985-89 they increased their nominal debt faster and the rate of growth of
GDP became a more important instrument for reducing their domestic debt to GDP
ratio.  Morocco reduced its annual average inflation rate fron 9 percent  in
1982-84 to 5  percent in 1985-89 and Portugal reduced its from 24 to 12 percent.- 34 -
The  second  strategy was  that  followed by Algeria.  Like the  other
countries considered, Algeria also increased substantially its domestic PS debt
to GDP ratio in the second half of the 1980s. However, like Pakistan, it is a
country that used  its domestic debt to avoid an economic  adjustment  in the
mid-1980s. 17 During most of the mid-1980s, Algeria raised substantial volumes
of nominal debt while limiting the growth of its domestic debt to GDP ratio.
It accomplished this by a combination of moderate inflation (hovering around 9
percent p.a.) and a high GDP growth.  But this changed in the late 1980s when
it experienced a slowdown in its GDP rate of growth.  The rate of growth of GDP
fell from an annual average of 5.8 percent in 1982-84  to 1.4 percent in 1985-89.
In spite of this however in  the late 1980s, Algeria's rate of inflation remained
moderate (hovering around 9 percent p.a.) and continued increasing its domestic
debt to GDP ratio by increasing its nominal debt.
The third strategy was that followed by Turkey.  It was a case of a
country with a low  domestic debt to GDP ratio.  However, this low domestic debt
level was explained by the debt strategy undertaken.  In the mid-1980s, Turkey
increased its nominal debt very fast, while experiencing a very high inflation
rate.  The economic adjustment undertaken in the early-1980s failed in leading
to a fall in inflation.  The effect of the inflation  on the domestic debt to GDP
ratio was so strong that in 1985-89 of the 3 percent of GDP increase in nominal
debt, the inflation rate effect reduced it by 2 percent of GDP and the effect
of the rate of growth was negligible despite the fact that GDP grew on average
by 3.7  percent.  In  1985-89,  the annual average rate  of inflation  was 53  percent.
This high inflation rate also limited Turkey's ability to use the domestic debt
17/ This  was in  spite  of  the fact  that  Algeria experienced  a significant  external
shock in the mid-1980s by the fall in the international price of oil.- 35 -
because  investors  in Government  securities demanded  a very  high premium  to
compensate for the price uncertainty.  Such conditions made domestic debt a very
expensive source of finance. 18
III.  THE  ROLE  OF  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS  AND  FINANCING
The role of fiscal policy in the overall debt strategy is the focus of
this section.  Fisca) policy is assessed using the concept of real deficit and
by including the central bank.
A.  The  Real  Public-Sector  Deficits
The linkages between the real PS deficit and the stocks of domestic and
external PS debt can be explained using the definition of real PS deficit, as
stated in equation (5):19
(5)  +  _rt  b  + r*t  bAH  +Ab  + A  *t  s0
18/  See  Thorne  (1991)  for  a  more  detailed  account  of  Turkey's  problems  with the
domestic  debt  management  in  the  late-1980s.
19/  To  simplify,  in  equation  (5)  we  omitted  the  cross-effects  .nd  the  foreign
exchange  capital  losses  terms.  Moreover,  the  public  sector  real  deficit  (see
Table  2)  is  defined  by  excluding  the  capital  losses due to  fluctuations in
domestic  and  international  exchange  rates  because  a  large  portion of them are
unrealized.  If  we  include  them,  the  estimated  deficits  would  differ  substantially
from  the  deficits  estimated  using  total  expenditures  and  revenues  (above-the-
line).  See  Thorne  (1991)  for  an  application  to  the  case  of  Turkey.- 36 -
D is the primary PS deficit, r* is the annual average real interest rate in US
dollars on external PS  debt, H is  the portion of the stock  of nominal base money
used for financing the public sector (real  adjusted base money) and the rest of
variables are as defined before.
Equation  (5) establishes the relation between the increase in stocks
and the real fiscal  deficits.  It indicates  that the stocks  of real domestic and
external PS  debt will increase if  the real fiscal deficits are large and if the
authorities limit the expansion in  nominal base money.  Therefore, equation (5)
enables us to relate the real fiscal deficit  to our previous analysis of changes
in debt stocks. It is apparent that the second term on the right of equation (5)
expressed as a ratio of real SDP is identical  to the sum of the first and second
components of equation  (3); and the third term on the right of equation  (5)
expressed as a ratio  of zeal  GDP is identical  to the first term in equation (1).
There are two other important aspects  of equation (5)  that require some
discussion.  First is the use of real PS deficit for assessing PS performance.
This deficit is corrected for the effects of both domestic and international
inflation. This  correction  provides  a  more  accurate  estimate  of  the  PS  performance.
More importantly,  it enables us to compare the PS performance of these  six
countries even though these countries experienced different inflation rates. 20
The  real  PS  deficit  classifies  as current  expenses  only  the  real interest  payments
and treats the compensation for  erosion of inflation (which is usually included
in the nominal interest  payments) as a source of finance because it is strictly
debt amortization.  Although the correction of international inflation might
20/  Although the inflation level also affects PS expenditures and revenueg,
this will be assumed to be small compare to the effect on domestic and external
PS debt.  See Tanzi (1977).- 37 -
appear  unnecessary,  it is not.  Our previous  discussion  has shown  that these
countries  were affected  by the international  inflation  rate because:  (i)  the
international  prices  experienced  wide fluctuations;  and (ii)  the  external  debt
was very large.
Second  is the  consolidation of the non-financial and central bank's
quasi-fiscal  deficits. This  consol,dation  enables  us to  correct  for  countries'
different  practices  in  recording  the  PS  deficit.  This  will  make  the  PS  performance
comparison  among  countries  more accurate.  It is common  for some countries  to
include  all  of  their  current  financial  expenses  in  their  non-financial  PS  accounts,
while  others  include  them  as  part  eof  the  central  bank. In  some  countries  central
banks  assume  a  prominent  role  in  granting  low-cost  loans  to  the  public  and  private
sectors  or  in  servicing  a  substan&tial  portion  of  the  exte=nal  debt  or  both  without
necessarily  reflecting  these  expenses  in  the  accounts  of  the  non-financial  public
sector.
The  six countries  have  been  classified  into  three  subgroups  according
to their  PS performance. A first  subgroup  consisting  of Portugal  and  Morocco
were  the  countries  that  undertook  a  remarkable  fiscal  adjustment;  a  second  group
consisting  of Algeria  and Turkey  undertook  a limited  adjustment;  and a third
group  consisting  of  Pakistan  and  Yugoslavia  undertook  no fiscal  adjustment  (See
Figure  S  and  Table  2). All  six  countries'  real  PS  deficits  showed  a  deterioration
in the early-1980s  resulting  from  the effect  of the external  shock.  In the
early-1980E  the six  countries  confronted  a sharp  increase  in  the real  interest
rate  as a result  of a higher  nominal  international  interest  rate  and  of a fall
in the international  inflation  rate.  The  differences  in PS performance  among
countries  after  1982  are  explained  by  the  extent  to  which  these  countries  undertook- 38 -
domestic policies in response to the 1980B external shock.
Morocco and Portugal undertook a fiscal adjustment in the early-1980s.
In  the case of Portugal these policies were preparatory for entering the EEC and
started  very  early in  the 1980s. Portugal's  real  PS deficit fell  from  7.6  percent
of GDP in 1980-81 to 5.2 percent In 1982-84 and to 3.4 percent in 1986-89.  By
1988-89 Portugal was showing a real PS balance surplus.  Although the extent to
which Portugal provides an example of what can be expected from an adjustment
is arguable because it benefitted substantially from joining the EEC, these
benefits were only apparent after 1984.  However, in 1982-84 Portugal undertook
most of the fiscal adjustment.
Morocco's domestic policies also led to a sharp fall in the real PS
deficit.  However, there were two differences with Portugal's.  First, most of
the adjustment took place after 1984.  The real PS deficit after reaching a  peak
of 14.6 percent of  GDP in 1984 fell  to an annual average of 4 percent in 1985-89.
Second,  Morocco combined  its  domestic  adjustment  policies  with  a  financing  policy.
The adjustment policies consisted of  the reform of the public and trade sectors,
while the financing consisted  of  the debt  relief granted  by its  foreign  creditors
starting in 1983 and the accumulation of  arrears with domestic public sector
contractors.  While  the  domestic  adjustment  reforms  contributed  to  the
restructuring of  the economy, the financing  policies contributed to lowering  the
cash-flow cost of the external debt and provided additional domestic financing.
For instance, while in 1982-84 the real PS deficit in accrual terms was 10.0
percent of GDP, in cash'flow terms it was 5.6 percent.  This financing policy
enabled Morocco to spread-out the heavy burden of debt payments over several
years, thus facilitating the domestic adjustment.- 39  -
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(P  g  od  GNP)
ALGEIUA  19641  106244  19549  MOROCCO  196041  196244  196t54
Toa  ReaI PS DelI  6.5  10.4  6.9  Total Real  PS  Deficit  0.0  10.0  4.5
(Exc. K locs  of For. Deb  (Excl.  K koins of For. Debt)
A  Adjusted  Money Finance  1.4  3.3  4.0  A. Adjusted  Money  Finance  1.2  1.0  0.5
Inlbation  Tax  2.3  2.2  2.8  Inflation Tax  1.5  1.2  0.7
Senorag  -0.9  1.1  1.2  Seignorage  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2
S. N  Dometic Dobt FIanc  (1)  1.2  2.2  1.6  B. Net DomeL;c  Debt Finance  0.9  2.6  3.3  1
Banks  -0.1  0.5  1.0  Net  Bank Credit  0.5  0.9  2.1  ° Privat  Sctor  0.2  0.6  0.0  Speclized  Fin. Org.  0.2  0.2  0.0  BAD  & CNEP  1.2  1.2  0.0  NonFinancial  Privte Sector  -0.1  0.1  1.5
Arrers  0.4  1.4  -0.3
C. Net Foreign Debt Financ  3.9  4.9  1.3
(Excl.  l  bI.  of  aFor.  Debt)  C. Net Foreign  Debt  Fince  3.9  6.3  0  6
(Excl. K lame  of For. Deb"
Incr"  in Foreign LbiWnlitI  7.0  2.8  0.6
ier  in Foreign Aset  3.1  -2.0  -0.6  Increase  in Foreign  Ubilitues  2.7  6.0  0.9
Increase  In Forein  Asste  -1.2  -0.3  0.3 D. Net Foreign Debt Finance  -3.8  -0.8  4 0
(hu  g.  lo  dof  For. Deb  D  Net  Foreign Debt  Finance  11.5  15.7  0.4
(ncW.  K.  lo  of For. Deb
MEMO:
F~on  Ehf.  Looms  (D-C)  -7.7  -5.6  2.0  MEMO:
Foreign  Exch.  Lome  D-C  7.6  10.3  -0.2
TOal  eA Ps Deficit  I.  12.9  11.2  3.9
BAD  Loans  to Enb  pils  Net  Foeign Dbt  Fnance  3.9  3.3  1.7
(Excl. K $oeseof  For Debt
and Debt RseeQTADLE  2:  REAL  CONSOUDATED  PtBUC  SECTOR  DEFICIT  (Con t)
(Perceag  of GNP)
PAKISTAN  1601  1962-44  19540  PORTUGAL  1941  196244  196540
Total  Real  PS  t..bcia  0.1  6.9  7.7  Total Real  PS  Deficit  7.6  5.2  3.4
(Excl. K losses  of For. Debt)  (Excluding K losses  dl  For Debt)
A. Adjusted  Money Finance  1.6  1.9  0.0  A. Adjusted  Money  Finance  5.9  3.5  4.2
Inlation Tax  1.6  083  0.9  Inflation  Tx  385  560  2.0
Selgnor  0.2  1.1  -0.2  Seignrage  2.1  -1.6  2.2
S. Not Domtnc  DebtF  fha  -2.0  3.3  5.9  8. Nt  Domest  Debt  Finance  4.9  -1.2  4.3
Instruments
C. Not Foeign De  Fbta  0.2  1.7  1.2  Bonds  and Bills  5.6  -2.4  6.2
(Exci. K.  kbex  ofdFor.  De)  Tresurybills  0.0  00  2.4
Government  bolds and other  5.6  -2.4  5.8
Incrsx  in Foeign Uabik  2.2  2.7  0.4  Net  Bank Cedit  -0.7  1.2  -3.9
ncrse  in Foeign Asseo  t  2.0  1.1  -0.7
Borrowers
D. Nt  Foreign Debt  Finance  -2.4  26  46  Ge6ral  Gonnment  5.8  -1.7  7.5
(Incl. K. lobs  of For. Debt)  Nonfinancial  PSEs  -0.9  0 5  -3.2
MEMO:  C. Net Foreign  Debt  Finance  -3.2  2.9  -5.2
Frigp  Exch. Loun  (D-C)  -2.6  1.0  3.4  (Excluding  K lome  of For.  Db)
Increse in Foreign  Labeitis  6.6  0.5  1.9
Incree  in Foreign  Asst  9.8  -2.5  7.1
D. Net Fortign Dbt  Fince  -2.1  9.6  -7.4
(Including K las  of For. Debt)
MELO: Foreign Exchange  Losses  (D-C)  1.1  6.7  -2.2TABLE 2: REAL  CONSOUDATED  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT  (Cant)
(Pereag  of GNP)
TURKIEY  1910-11  1962-44  196548  YUGOSLAVIA  1961  196244  1967
Total Real  PS Defcoi  -0.9  e.7  5.4  Real  Quasi-Fiscal  Deficit  3.7  6.2  8.7
(Excluding K lwses ol Fof. Debt)
A. Money Finance  2.2  2 7  4.3
A. Adjusted  Money Finance  0.5  4.5  2.7  Inflation Tax  3.6  3.6  4.9
Seignorage  -1.4  -0.9  -0.7
Inflation Tax  1.4  3.0  2.9
Seignorage  -0.9  1.5  -0.1  S. Debt Finance  -1.5  -3.4  -2.4
B. Not  Domnetic  Debt  Fince  -2.3  -0.5  1.4
Bonds and BiNl  -0.2  0.3  0.7
Net Bank Crdt  -1.6  -45  0.4
ESFe  00  00  0.0
C. Net Fofeign Debt Finn  0.9  2.7  1.3
(Excluding K lome of For. Debt)
D. Net Fofeign Debt Finance  53  5.1  1.8
(Including K km"  of For. Debt)
MEMO: Fofeign  Exchange  Losses  (D-C)  4.4  2.4  0.6
SOURCE: See Annex.- 43 -
Algeria and Turkey are cases of limited PS adjustment.  Algeria is a
case of a socialist economy that postponed its adjustment and transition to a
market economy until the late-1980s  and limited  the effect of the external shock
of the 1980a by letting its domestic currency overvalue in real terms.  These
policies resulted in an initial improvement in its real PS deficit in 1982-83,
but  it  then  deteriorated  very  fast  in  1984-85. It  was  this  PS  deficit  deterioration
and  the negative effect  of  the oil  shock in  the  mid-1980s that led  the  authorities
to start  adjusting the economy.  However,  Algeria's domestic adjustment  policies
were partial when compared to those undertaken by Morocco and Portugal and this
could partly explain the difference in economic dynamism. 21 Algeria's real PS
deficit fell from a peak of 18.5 percent of GDP in 1984 to an annual average
deficit of 6.9 percent of GDP in 1985-89.  Although there is little question
concerning the  improvement in PS performance in the late-1980s, the real PS
deficit  estimate might  hide the true PS  adjustment because  it excludes the
operations of public sector enterprises.
Turkey  is also a case of limited PS adjustment, this is despite the
fact that in the early-1980s  (before the external shock) it undertook a very
strong and comprehensive domestic adjustment.  In fact, Turkey's adjustment
policies were perhaps more radical than those undertaken by countries such as
Morocco and Portugal, and this might explain its  private sector dynamism.  This
adjustment consisted of trade, fiscal and financial sector reforms.  In the
mid-1980s Turkey's PS, as the other six countries, was also negatively affected
by the external  shock thus resulting in a real PS deficit, but this was not
promptly corrected.  Turkey's real PS balance shifted from a 0.9 percent of GDP
21/  A more fundamental reason was the participation of the private sector in
the economy.- 44 -
surplus in 1980-81 to a deficit of 6.7 percent in 1982-84 and 5.4 percent in
1985-89.22  The  1989 fiscal improvement was explained by the effect of the
overvaluation of the real exchange rate on the external debt payments.
Pakistan and Yugoslavia illustrate cases of countries that undertook
no PS adjustment.  In the 1980s in both countries the real PS deficits showed
no improvement trend.  In  the case of Pakistan despite the authorities repeated
attempts to reduce the deficit, the plans were never implemented or they were
postponed. 23 In the case of Yugoslavia the fiscal disadjuscment originated in
the central bank, e.g., quasi-fiscal deficit.  As the autho:-ities  devalued  the
currency in an effort to correct relative prices, this generated substantial
foreign exchange losses in  the enterprise and banking sectors  which were covered
by the central bank.  In Pakistan in 1983  the real PS deficit reached a peak of
9.6  percent  of GDP and  was 7.7  percent  on  average in 1985-89. While in  Yugoslavia
in 1983  the real quasi-fiscal deficit  was 8.8 percent of  GDP and  was 6.7  percent
on average in 1985-87.
B. Sources  of  Finance  and  Inflation
The  six countries' differences in fiscal adjustment are mirrored by
differences in the sources used to finance their deficits.  These differences
explained  the  different  effects  that  the  deficits  had  on  macroeconomic  performance
and,  in  particular, on inflation  performance.  In  general, the larger  the portion
22/  Turkey's  case  is also different from other countriei, such as Morocco's,
because  Turkey  did  not  reschedule  its  external  PS debt nor benefit from external
debt  relief.  Although  these  differences  had  no  direct  effects  on the real PS
deficit  estimates  in  Table  2 because they were calculated in accrual terms,  it
had  an  indirect  effect through the eources of finance.
23/  See  Montiel  and  Ul Haque (1990).- 45 -
of the deficit financed by money creation, the greater the inflation rate.  In
turn, the portion of the deficit financed by money creation is explained by the
size of the deficit and availability of external and domestic debt financing.
We will start by describing the differences in financing patterns and then we
will relate them to the level of inflation.
The  two  countries  that undertook  a  successful fiscal  adjustment,  Morocco
and Portugal, relied on external and domestic debt as their primary sources of
finance and relied very little on money finance.  In 1982-84, both countries
financed their deficit using  foreign finance and to a  less extent domestic
finance.  In 1985-89, this pattern changed and they relied  more on domestic than
on external  finance.  In  1982-84 the  external  debt financed  about half  of
Portugal's deficit and about a third of Morocco's, while domestic debt finance
was negative in Portugal and contributed to about a third of Morocco's deficit.
In 1985-89, the external debt finance was negative in Portugal and less than a
fourth of the deficit in Morocco, while domestic debt finance was larger than
the deficit in  Portugal (was  used for  repaying the external  debt) and about  three
quarters of the deficit in  the case of Morocco.  Money finance in  both countries
was very small.  In the case of Portugal it fell from 5.9 percent of GDP in
1980-82 to 3.5 in 1982-84 and increased to 4 percent in 1985-89.  However, the
increase in money  finance was used to finance the increase in central bank's
foreign  assets and  resulted from  the rapid re-monetization  after Portugal joined
the EEC.  In the case  of Morocco. money finance  was extremely low throughout the
1980s.  It fell from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1980-82 to 1.0 percent in 1982-84 and
to 0.5 percent in 1985-89.- 46  -
The two countries that undertook a limited fiscal adjustment, Algeria
and  Turkey, showed some  similarities  with Morocco and  Portugal  but also important
differences in terms of deficit financing.  The similarities  consisted of having
had access to external debt finance until the mid-1980s, while the differences
were the restricted access to domestic finance and the greater use of money
finance.  In  1982-84,  external  debt  financed  half  of  Algeria  and  Turkey's  deficits,
while domestic debt financed one fourth of Algeria'e deficit and nothing of
Turkey's.  This happened while these two countries' deficits were increasing
relative to  the  1980-81  level.  In 1985-89, external  finance  fell  in both
countries.  In Algeria it fell to one sixth of the deficit, while in Turkey it
fell to one fourth.  However, this fall in external finance was not matched by
an increase in domestic debt finance.  Both in Algeria and Turkey domestic debt
finance was one fourth of the deficit.  Both countries compensated the absence
of domestic debt in 1982-84 a.d the fall in  external debt finance in 1985-89 by
resorting to money finance.  In  Algeria money finance increased from 1.4 percent
of GDP in 1980-81 to 3.3 percent in 1982-84 and to 4.0 percent in 1985-89.  In
Turkey  money finance increased from  0.5 percent of  GDP in 1980-81 to 4.5 percent
in 1982-84 and was 2.7 percent in 1985-89.  In 1985-89 and in both countries,
money finance contributed to financing about half of the total deficit.
Tho  two  countries  that  made  no  fiscal  adjustment,  Pakistan  and  Yugoslavia,
are extreme cases.  Pakistan is an extreme case of domestic debt finance, while
Yugoslavia is an extreme case of money finance.  It is this dissimilarity in
financing patterns that explains the difference in macroeconomic performance.
Pakistan increased  its  domestic  debt financing from  -2.2  percent  of  GDP in  1980-81
to 3.3  percent in 1982-84  and  to 6 percent in  1985-89.  This increase in  domestic
debt financed  the increase  in  the  deficit from  0  percent in 1980-82  to 6.8  percent- 47 -
in  1982-84  and  compensated for  the fall in  external  debt and  money finance  between
1982-84 and 1985-89.  External debt finance fell from 2.7 percent of GDP to 0.4
percent and  money finance from 1.9  percent to 0.4  percent.  In  Yugoslavia a large
portion of the increase in the quasi-fiscal deficit was financed using money
finance. While in 1980-81  money financed  accounted for  about half  of  the  deficit,
in 1985-87 it accounted for two thirds of the total.
Inflation  had  a  very  important  role  in  financing  the  PS  deficit. Countries
that resorted actively to  money finance  were also the countries that experienced
the highest  inflation rates  (see Figure  6).  Examples  of  these cases  were
Yugoslavia, Turkey, Portugal in the early-1980s and Algeria in the mid-1980s.
But more importantly, the reverse was also true: countries that limited their
reliance on money finance were the countries with the lowest inflation rates.
These were the cases of Morocco, Pakistan and Portugal in  the second half of the
1980s.  Inflation, therefore, was used as a last-resort mechanism to raise the
additional finance.  Typically these were the countries that: (i) confronted a
heavy external  debt burden;  (ii)  had limited  posribilities  of raising  additional
external and domestic PS debt; and (iii)  performed a very small (if any) fiscal
adjustment.
The  relation  between  money  finance  and  the  inflation  rate  can  be
illustrated by breaking down money finance into seignorage and inflation-tax,
as  shown in equation (6):
(6)  AHt  hi-  [  h,  +hr__
GDPt  rgdp  1 + ptJ  rgdpt- 48 -
h is the adjusted money base in domestic currency divided by the domestic price
index, p is the end-period domestic price index and the rest of variables are
as before.
Equation (6)  establishes the well-known money market equilibrium con-
dition and its relation with the real PS deficit and changes in stocks of debt
is  established by equation (5).  The first component at the right of equation (6)
is the seignorage and the second is the inflation-tax.  This equation indicates
that if the authorities expand the money base in  excess of asset-holders' demand
for  base  money--captured by seignorage--then  this  will result in  a disequilibrium
in the money market and thus  in a greater  inflation level. 24 This equation
therefore links the real PS deficits with the inflation level.  Also, equation
(6)  indicates  that for a given demand for  money, the higher  the inflation level,
the  larger  the volume  of  resources  appropriated through  the  inflation-tax.
Therefore, using  equation  (6) we  can estimate the  amount of  resources that
countries raised through inflation.  These estimates are reported in Table 2.
Estimates  for the breakdown of money  finance for the  six countries
indicate that countries that performed a limited or no adjustment (except for
Pakistan)  raised  substantial  resources  through  the  inflation-tax  and  these  reached
their highest level in 1985-89.  These are the cases of Algeria, Turkey and
Yugoslavia.  In 1985-89, Algeria  financed a  third of  its deficit with  the
inflation-tax,  Turkey about half and Yugoslavia about three quarters.  Of these
countries  Algeria was the only country  that experienced a  modest inflation rate,
but in  Turkey it  reached about  80  percent  p.a. in  the  late-1980s and in  Yugosl&via
24/  The demand  for base money assumes a unitary elasticity with respect to
nominal income, which might not hold in countries experiencing high inflation
levels.  However, this is only used for illustrative purposes.- 49  -
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it reached about 170 percent in 1987. In this respect, these three countries
replicate the experience of the highly-indebted Latin American countries which
experienced very high inflation levels.
However and as is well-known, inflation-financing is a self-defeating
policy.  First,  inflation also  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  revenue  from
inflation-tax which becomes stronger as the inflation raLe increases. 25 This
results from the negative elasticity of demand for money with respect to the
inflation  rate. Therefore,  the  higher  the inflation  rate  the lower  asset-holders'
demand for base money and the luwer  the inflation tax.  Second and perhaps more
important, a fiiancing policy based on high inflation undermines the ability of
the PS to use domestic debt as a source of finance.
Portugal's experience is  worth looking  at.  In 1983  Portugal's inflation
rate reached about 36 percent and durinq most of the early-1980s the inflation
tax was the most important source of revenue. Also, domestic debt financing was
very unimportant.  In 1980-81, the inflation-tax accounted for about 50 percent
of  the  deficit and  in  1982-84  for  about 100  percent. But  the  authorities radically
changed this in the mid-1980s by bringing the inflation-rate down to about 10
percent p.a. In 1985, they also developed the market for Government securities
by liberalizing  their financial system.  The results were impressive: in 1985-89
domestic debt financing accounted for more than 100 percent of the deficit and
demand for money was so strong that it enabled the authorities to expand base
money  without causing inflation.  Expansion in  base money also accounted for  100
percent of the deficit.  This enabled the  authorities to accumulate foxeign
reserves equivalent to their total external debt.
25/  See Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991).- 51-
IV.  EFFECTS  OF  PUBLIC  INDEBTEDNESS  ON  THE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
A  key  aspect of a debt strategy  is its  effect on the private sector and
its  response.  Ideally,  the  strategy  should  aim  at  minimizing the  negative  effects
on the private sector and maximize its positive response.  In this section we
consider these problems.
A.  The  Transfer  Problem
The  real net  savings identity relates the  real net  savings of the
external, public and private sectors.  Using this identity we will be able to
analyze the effects on the private sector of the public sector  debt strategy and
deficit policies.  By  definition the sum  of the real net savings  of the external,
public and private sectors are zero, as expressed in equation (7):
1(7)  rns  ex + rns  pu  + rns  pr  - 0
rns is  ratio of real  net savings  to real  GDP, superscripts  ex, Pu  and pr  indicate
the external, public and private sectors.  The real net savings of the external
sector is the non-interest current account with opposite sign plus the XLI.
interest payr.ents  on total external debt and is equal to the increase in total
net external debt.  This expressed as ratio of GDP, is shown as equation (8):- 52  -
(8)  ex  **  *T,' rns,  -nica  t-  et+  dt
.*T  . _ 8 0
rgdpt
nica is the non-interest current account in US dollars as ratio of real GDP,
superscript T denotes total external debt (private and public sector) 26 and the
rest of variables are as defined before.  The real net savings of the public
sector is the real PS deficit with opposite sign and the real net savings of the
private sector is estimated as a residual using equation (7).
In  equation (7)  the net savings identity  is  defined in  real terms.  This
identity  in  real terms  provides  a more  accurate  estimate  of the  resources
transferred between sectors  because it  classifies  only  the real  interest  payments
on the domestic and external debt as an expense of the public sector and as an
income of the private and external sectors.  As  is well-known, when nominal
interest  payments on the  external and  domestic debt are  classified as  an expense,
the PS exp.nditureu and the savings  of the external and private sectors will be
overestimated because the  compensation  for  the  erosion  of inflation  is  classified
as an expense rather than as a capital amortization.  Moreover, using the real
net savings id'antity,  we will be able to make comparisons among countries that
experienced  different domestic and  external inflation  rates and different levels
of domestic and external debts.
26/  In most  countries the private external debt accounted for a very  small
proportion of the total external debt.- 53 -
Using equation (7)  we can analyze the effects on the private sector of
the public sector  debt strategy  and fiscal deficit policies.  This equation will
indicate wheth-er  a country experienced an external or an internal transfer or
both as a result of these policies.  An external transfer will be experienced
when resources are transferred to service the external debt, while an internal
transfer will be experienced when the domestic PS debt increases.  An external
transfer is a transfer between the external sector, on one side, and the public
and private sectors, on the other.  An internal transfer is a transfer between
the public and  the private sectors.  An internal  tranafer can result because the
public  sector  needs  reitources  to  finance  the  deficit  or  because  it  needs  additional
resourcee to finance the external debt or both.  Therefore, the debt strategies
and the deficit policies undertaken will have an effect in terms of transfer of
resources from the external to the public sectors and from the private to the
public sectors.  (The real net savings estimates are reported in Table 3.)
Concerning the external tranefer, in the 1980s most of the countries
experienced a change in the resources transferred from abroad.  This resulted
from the external shock (less availability of foreign finance and higher real
cost of external debt) and from their external debt strategy.  While in 1982-84
most countries benefitted from a positive net real exteraal savings (a  positive
net transfer from abroad), in 1985-89 most countries experienced either a fall
(Portugal) or negative net real external savings (a negative net transfer from
abroad).  The only country that did not experience this change was Pakistan,
which experienced a small increase in its real net external savings from 1.0
percent of GDP to 1.5  percent.  The countries that experienced the most dramatic
change were Yugoslavia, Morocco and Portugal.  In Yugoslavia this change was
quite dramatic.  Real net external savings shifted from 2.7 percent of GDP in- 54 -
1982-84  to -11  percent in  1985-89.  In  Morocco and  Portugal the real net external
savings  fell in  about  6  percent  of  GDP  between 1982-84  and  1985-89. The countries
whose real  net external savings  experienced a  small fall  were Algeria and Turkey.
In both countries the real net external savings fell in about 1 percent of GDP
between 1982-84 and 1985-89.
Countries differ on the effects of the external transfer on the private
sector real net savings. That is, on the magnitude of the internal transfer.
In this respect,  the six countries  can be  divided into  two groups.  A first  group
relates to the countries that confronted a very small external transfer.  These
are the cases of Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey.  Note that these countries were
the  ones  that  performed  a  very limited (Algeria  and  Turkey)  or  no  fiscal  adjustment
(Pakistan). However, the  combined  effect of the  external  transfer and the fiscal
adjustment (or  lack of  thereof) affected  the private sector differently in  these
three countries.  This  is apparent when  the periods 1982-84 and 1985-89 are
compared.  In  Algeria these combined effects resulted in a fall in the transfer
of resources between the private and the public sectors (real  net private sector
savings)  because  the small  fiscal  adjustment  off-set  the  fall in  real  net  external
savings. In  Pakistan  although  the  real  PS  deficit increased,  this  was compensated
by the increase in rea± net external savings and thus the private sector was
unaffected.  In  Turkey  the combined  effect  resulted  in  a  greater internal  transfer
from the private to the public sector because the fall in real net external
savings was not compensated by a fiscal adjustment.
A second group concerns the countries that confronted a larger external
transfer.  These are the cases of Morocco, Portugal and Yugoslavia.  However,
these three countries responded differently to the fall in real net external- 55  -
TABLE 3J REAL  SAVINGS  MLANCES
(Pero"  of GOP)
ALGERIA  196244  196546
Total Net Savings:  0.0  0.0
(uA+84C)
A. Foreign Sector  -0.6  -1.4
S.  Public Sectot  -10.4  -4.9
C.  Pivate Sector  11.2  6.3
Inflation tax  2.2  2.6
Memo  item:
NICAGOP  3.0  1.6
MOROCCO  1912-44  106544
Total Not Savings:  0.0  0.0
A. Foreign Sector  5.9  -1I.
B.  Public Sector  -10.0  -4.5
Gross  Savings  -3.4  0.1
Investment  6.1  4.6
C. Private Sector  4.1  6.0
(Irsa  Savings  22.9  23.1
Market  Oetermined  21.7  22.4
Inflation  Tax  1.2  0.7
Investment  13.J  17.1
Memo item:
NICAIJGOP  -13.2  .4.5
PAKISTAN  1962-44  1965-69
Total Net Savings:  0.0  0.0
(-A+8+C)
A. Foreign Sector  1.1  1.6
B.  Public Sector  4.9  -7.7
Grao Saving.  2.6  1.2
Investment  0.4  6.0
C.  Private  Sector  5.8  6.2
Oroe  savings  13.1  13.0
Market Determind  12.3  13.1
Infltion Tax  0.8  0.
Investment  7.3  7.7
Memo item:
NICAIGDP  -0.6  -0.6- 56  -
TABLE 3: REAL  SAVINGS  BALANCES  (Cant)
(Percent ad  GOP)
PORTUGAL  1O14-4  19641
Total Net Savings:  0.0  0.0
(-A.8.C)
A. Foreign Sector  6.1  05
S.  Public Sector  -5.2  -3.4
Gross Savings  -1.5  0.4
InvstmeMnt  3.  3.8
C.  Private  Sector  -0.9  2.9
Groes  Savings  25.5  25.7
Market  Determined  20.5  23.7
inflation Tax  5.0  2.0
Investment  20.4  22.8
Memo  item:
NICAIGOP  -2.9  3.9
TURKEY  19-114  l196510
Total Net Savings:  0.0  0.0
(uA+.SC)
A. Foreign Sector  1.6  -0.2
S.  Public Sector  -8.7  -5.4
Gross Savings  3.8  6.5
Investment  10.5  11.9
C.  Private Sctor  5.1  5.3
Gross Savings  12.9  16.5
Market  Determined  9.9  13.6
Inftltlon  TaX  3.0  2.9
Investment  7.9  10.9
Memo  item:
NICAJGOP  0.6  3.4
YUGOSLAVIA  1912-6  1915-16
Total Net Savings:  0.0  0.0
(wA+S+C)
A.  Forsign Scvtor  2.8  -10.8
B.  Public Sector  -0.2  -0.7
C.  Private Sector  3.4  17.5
Memo item:
NICE:SP  3A9  5e1
SODURCE:  See Annex.- 57 -
savings.  While Morocco and Portugal undertook a strong fiscal adjustment,
Yugoslavia did not make a fiscal  adjustment. This difference in  response and  the
magnitude of the external transfer explains the difference in the effect on the
private sector.  Morocco and  Portugal cushioned the effect on the private sector
by reducing their fiscal deficits.  But in spite of this fiscal adjustment the
private sector had to transfer resources to the public sector.  As explained
before, in  these two countries the  public sector responded to the external shock
by increasing its domestic PS debt.  In Morocco the private sector transfer
increased from 4.1 percent of GDP in 1982-84 to 6.0 in 1985-89; and in Por:;ugal
it  increased from  -0.9 percent  to 2.9  percent.  Yugoslavia  exemplifies a dramatic
case. The drast:c fall in  real net  external  savings  had  to be  completely financed
by an increase in  private sector real net savings.  This savings increased from
3.4 percent of GDP in 1982-84 to 17.5 percent in 1985-89.
Did the increasing reliance on private sector savings affect private
sector activity  and  economic  growth?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  not
straightforward.  First, economic theory is ambiguous.  On the one hand, there
is the Keynesian Theory that states that the greater the public expenditures,
the greater the rate of growth of GDP and the greater the private investment;
and  on  the  other,  there  is  the  Neoclassical  Theory  that  emphasizes  the  crowding-out
effect and predicts that the larger the fiscal deficits, the higher the cost of
capital and thus the  lower private investment. Second, available evidence is
ambiguous concerning the predominant effect.  Country studies indicate that:- 58  -
(i) a fall in public sector expenditure affects private investment and growth;
and (ii)  a larger fiscal  deficit that results in high real interest rates crowds
out private sector investment. 27
Preliminary  analysis  for  four countries  (evidence for  Algeria  and
Yugoslavia was unavailable, see Table 3) indicates that an internal transfer
performed by increasing the private sector's real net savings was associated
with  a fall  in private  investment rather than an  increase in gross private
savings.  This is  partial evidence of the crowding-out effect.  Examples are  the
cases of Morocco and Portugal. In Morocco the private investment fell from 19
percent in 1982-84  to 17  percent in 1985-89;28  and in Portugal  private investment
fell from 26 percent to 23 percent.  However, in both countries gross private
sector  savings experienced a  very small  increase.  In  Pakistan the  private sector
experienced very little change in terms of transfer of resources and this was
reflected in an unchanged private sector investment.  However, the low private
investment (by international standards) might be explained by the large public
sector  deficits and  their use of  domestic  PS debt as  the  main source  of finance. 29
Turkey is the exception to this rule because the private sector increased the
resources transferred to the public sector by increasing their gross savings
27/  See Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991).
28/  In Morocco this  has become an important concern in terms of  long-term
sustainablilty because the 1980s adjustment resulted in a  considerable fall in
total investment (public and private).
29/  It is interesting to note, in  passing, that the debt-neutrality hypothesis
would predict a high private savings rate for  Pakistan because of the large size
of the domestic PS debt, but this is not confirmed by the available evidence.
Evidence  on  gross savings  indicate  a  low  savings  rate.  However,  this  would require
further analysis.- 59 -
rather than by cutting private investment.  Gross savings increased from 12.9
percent  in 1982-84 to  16.5 percent in 1985-89 and this  also resulted  in an
increase in private investment from 8 percent to 11 percent.
However,  Turkey's experience  differs  from that  of  the  other three
countries in two main aspects.  First, the public sector devoted large amounts
of resources to subsidizing the private sector investment and, in particular,
investment in tradeables.  These subsidies, in turn, explained the fast growth
in private investment and the dynamism  of the tradeable sector during the 1980s.
Second, Turkey is the only country that reformed and liberalized its financial
system.  Although this did not mean that the crowding-out effect disappeared
because the  fiscal deficit was  large, it reduced the crowding-out effect by
making the system more transparent.  Since in Turkey the interest rates were
market-determined, the crowding-out effect was transmitted through an increase
in interest rates and it affected  both private savings and investment.  This was
not  the case of Morocco and  Portugal that kept  their financial systems repressed
until the late-1980s.  Both countries had controls on the interest rates and
used bank reserves and forced investments as mechanisms to transfer resources
from the public to the private sector.  In these countries the crowding-out
effect was transmitted through a credit rationing:  The larger the financing
requirements of  the public sector  the  greater the credit  rationing on  the private
sector and thus the  lower the private investment. However, since the excess
demand  for credit was not reflected in a higher real interest rate, private
sector savings were not encouraged.- 60 -
B.  Effects  on  the  Domestic  Financial  System
A problem that requires further analysis is the effect on the private
sector of the PS debt strategy and real deficits policies.  Evidence for these
six  countries indicates  that  the larger  the  transfer  of  resources  from  the  private
to the public sectors, the greater the negative effect on the private sector
development.  This is because less volume of resources can be allocated (credit
rationing)  by  the  financial  system  to  the  private  sector  or  because  these  resources
become more expensive or  both.  Although the real net savings  estimates provided
us an idea of this effect, this might be an inaccurate estimate because not all
private savings are deposited in the financial system. A more accurate way of
assessing ti,is  effect is by measuring the portion of the financial resources
claimed by the public sector relative to the private sect r supply of financial
savings.  This can  be measured  by: (i)  the ratio of  the stock  of nominal domestic
PS debt to nominal M2; and (ii)  the ratio of  money finance plus nominal domestic
PS debt to financial savings  (in Table  4 this is the ratio of total fiscal
pressure to total private financial savings). 30 The higher these two ratios,
the greater the PS deficit pressure on the financial system and the greater the
credit rationing or the real interest rates or both (see Figure 7).
The evidence for five countries (data was unavailable for Yugoslavia)
indicatei that a result of  their debt strategy and deficit policies was  an
30/  These ratios use  nQminal domestic PS  debt because this  measure the PS  demand
for resources.  In every period the PS has to issue sufficient domestic debt to
finance the deficit and the erosion effect of inflation.  Also, asset holders
decide their investments in nominal terms and they have to determine in every
period  whether  they  want to  re-invest  the  compensation  for  the  erosion  of  inflation
or :-t.  Using real domestic PS debt would have presumed that  asset holders
always re-invest the compensation for the erosion of inflation, which is not
necessarily true.- 61 -
increase  in  the fiscal  pressure  on  the financial  system. However,  the  differences
can be explained by the differences in domestic financial policies.  Countries
can be grouped into: (i) those that experienced an increase in the transfer of
resources from  the private to the public sectors (Morocco,  Portugal and Turkey);
and (ii)  those that did not experience such an increase (Algeria  and Pakistan).
In the first group, Morocco and Portugal are cases that experienced a
moderate increase. This  is  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  these  two  countries  performed
a fiscal adjustment.  In both cases the increase in the ratio of domestic PS
debt to  M2 was more apparent and  resulted from  their greater reliance  on domestic
debt. 31 This increase in the pressure on the financial system led to a very
sharp increase in the real interest rate on Government securities (see Figure
7) and this is despite the fact that both countries controlled their interest
rates.  The authorities had to adjust these interest rates in  order to make the
domestic debt more attractive to asset holders.  However, as we noted before,
this  resulted in the  fall of private  investment and both effects, tne real
interest rate and the credit rationing, might have played a role.  However,
Morocco and Portugal kept the pressure at moderate levels by combining a low-
inflation  policy (limited  reliance on  money finance)  and a  policy to  adjust their
real interest rates.  These policies encouraged the supply of financial assets
by making domestic assets attractive to asset holders.
Also in the  first group, Turkey is a case that experienced a rapid
increase in the pressure of the PS deficits.  This increase explained the rapid
31/  In 1987-89, Portugal also experienced an increase in the ratio of total
fiscal pressure to private financial savings, but this was explained  by the
expansion in base money  (re-monetization) used to finance the increase in net
foreign assets.- 62 -
increase in  the real interest rate on  Government securities.  In particular, the
increase in interest rates is closely associated with the increase in the ratio
of domestic PS debt to M2.  Both showed a rapid increase in the mid-1980s, when
Turkey was trying to increase its reliance on  domestic debt finance.  But Turkey
also showed a fast increase in  the other ratio (total  fiscal  pressure to private
financial savings), which increased from  close to nothing in 1981 to 80 percent
in 1989.  This is explained by T'!-key's  reliance on money finance and by the
high inflation rates that resulted.  Since the inflation rates were ver, high
and unanticipated by asset-holders, it led to a fall in the supply of financial
assets.  This was in spite of the fact  that real interest rates were very high.
Therefore, in Turkey the large fiscal deficits combined wvch the fall in the
supply  of financial assets made the pressure of the fiscal deficit much worse.
Although its  effect on  the  private sector  investment  was off-set  through a subsidy
poli.y,  - high pressure, the high real interest rates and the high inflation
might indicate  that this deficit policy can not be sustained in  the medium term.
The second  group of countr_es are Algeria and Pakistan.  Although these
two countries experienced very little change in the transfer of resources from
the private to the public sector between 1982-84 and 1985-89, the ratios of
pressure of the  fiscal deficit on the  financial system showed a very  rapid
increase.  This is  the case of both ratios.  In the case of hlgeria the pressure
resulted from its reliance on both domestic PS debt and money finance,  while in
Pakistan it resulted from its reliance on domestic PS debt finance.  Although
both countries had controls on their interest rates, only Pakistan kept real- 63  -
TABLE  4:  PRESSURE  OF CONSOUDATED  PUBLIC  SECTOR  OEFICIT  ON THE
DOMESTC FINANCIAL  MARKET
(In Poro nt)
lW  1981  1962  19N  1964  Ibi  196  1967  19OU  I
ALGERIA
Ratio  of Stock  of not Domestic  Pub. Debt  25.1  25.8  27.8  28.2  28.4  29.3  31.4  32.9  32.9  40.3
to M2
RatioofTotalFiwcaPresur,  toPrivato  81.7  -5.5  26.8  84.5  44,6  82.7  548.1  97.1  67.2  165.1
Financial Savings
MOROCCO
RatioofStockofnotDomoestic Pub. Debt  43.5  42.5  52.3  50.4  57.7  60.1  70.6  73.4  67.9  Ga.7
to M2
Ratio  of Total Fiscal Pressureto Private  103.4  4.8  130.1  82.2  114.2  85.5  107.9  100.6  51.9  8U.4
Financial Savings
PAIQSTAN
Ratio  of Stock  of not Domestic Pub.  Debt  58.7  49.3  52.6  50.8  62.0  69.1  85.5  92.7  106.3  113.4
to M2
Ratioof Total Fiscal  Pressuro  to Private  77.3  4.2  81.1  88.6  366.7  125.3  182.4  144.8  265.6  272.4
Financial Savings
FIORTUGAL
Ratio  of Stock of Nt  Dornoetic  Pub. Debt  35.8  34.0  31.4  31.7  31.8  33.8  39.0  45.5  40.1  45.1
to M2
RatioolTot  Fisal  Pressure  to Private  62.5  57.3  42.8  56.3  30.0  42.9  75.2  141.2  108.3  134.7
Financial Savings
TURKEY
Ratio  of Stock of Not Domestic Pub.  Debt  22.5  18.5  23.5  21.0  32.3  29.1  25.7  23.5  27.4  29.7
to M2
Ratio  of Total Fiscal Pressure  to Private  38.4  6.6  44".  10.0  59.2  52.0  30.7  71.1  83.5  79.5
Financial Savings
YUGOSLAVIA
Ratioof7ota  ihscalPresaurstoPrivate  83.1  152.7  148.8  80.2  177.2  182.7  1U5.8  147.6
Financial  Savings
SOURCE:  See Annex.- 6t  -
FIGURE 7
REAL INTEREST  RATE ON DOMESTIC  PUBLIC  DEBT
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interest rates positive.  This is explained by the difference in sources of
finance  used.  In general, large  deficits financed  with domestic PS debt require
positive  interest  rates  to  make  Government  securities  attractive  to  asset-holders.
The high ratios of pressure of the fiscal deficits in both countries
indicate  that the private sector  w&a being affected  through the credit  rationing
effect.  In  the past and  until the  mirid-1980s,  Algeria's supply  of financial  asset
was strong because of the money overhang, 32 but this changed in 1985 when the
supply  of financial  savings started  to fall. Also, in  the past  Pakis4an  sustained
its domestic PS debt policy by following a low-inflation policy and positive
real interest  rates on  Government securities (as  Morocco and  Portugal).  However,
this changed in the late-1980s and the pressure of the fiscal deficits and the
inflation rates started to increase very fast (see Figure 6).  Therefore, the
fast  increase in  the ratios for fiscal pressure on  the financial system indicate
that the fiscal policy of these two countries is unsustainable because it is
pre-empting the development of the private sector.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we described how six EMENA countries responded to the
external shock of the 1980s.  We focused on the differences among them and also
emphasized their differences with the highly-indebted Latin American countries.
The analysis s':arted  with the stocks of debt and how the external shock induced
these cou,ntries  to develop  a domestic and external debt  strategy.  We then
proceeded to the analysis of the role of fiscal deficits and how deficit policy
32/  This is the involuntary demand for money that results when a price control
policy and shortages in the goods markets are combined.  See Khadr and Parks
(1991).- 66 -
was used to cushion the negative effects while minimizing the effects on the
macroeconomy.  And  finally we relate the  public debt  strategy and deficits
policies to the private sector development and economic growth.
From our  analysis  it is  impossible to  identify a country that was
completely successful in their debt strategies.  Each country faced different
conditions and responded in  a different  way.  The most successful countries  were
those that:  (i) minimized the effects of the external shocki-  by combining an
external and domestic debt strategy; (ii)  adjusted their fiscal deficits; (iii)
experienced a positive external shock; and (iv) fostered growth by minimizing
the effects  on  the private  sector and by  developing and  liberalizing their
financial system.  Although no single country fully implemented this strategy,
the most successfLl ones were Portugal, Morocco and Turkey.  This contrast with
the  strategy  pursued  by  some  Latin  American  countries,  which  although  experiencing
a similar external shock, failed to under"Lake  a fiscal adjustment and financed
most of their deficit through money finance, thus resulting in high-inflation
levels  and  in  overburdening  their  private  sector. Yugoslavia  reveals very  similar
features.- 67 -
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